Photo: NASA
Collins Aerospace, a North Carolina-based major aerospace contractor with deep roots in Brevard County, is under scrutiny following a critical NASA Inspector General report that highlights serious performance issues with the company’s management of the spacesuits used on the International Space Station.
Collins is a unit of RTX (formerly Raytheon Technologies) and it employs thousands in Brevard County and plays a pivotal role in Florida’s aerospace ecosystem. The company supports not only the ISS program but also numerous spaceflight systems through partnerships with NASA’s Kennedy Space Center and commercial space providers operating along the Space Coast.
With over 110 missions and nearly 300 spacewalks to its credit, the Collins Extra Vehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) is an integral part of the ISS and a key component of the American space program. Spacecraft in their own right, these complex systems allow human extracurricular activities outside of ISS where the crew can perform repair, insulation, experiment retrieval and other vital activities for the ongoing functionality of the orbiting outpost. Simply put, they are critical items, even if the general public often takes them for granted.
The Report
You can read the report for yourself below, or download it to read in Acrobat Reader or a similar PDF viewer.
EMU Current Situation
18 EMU suits were originally manufactured, and the last time a number was reported — in 2017 — the number of functioning EMUs had dropped to 11, and conventional wisdom in the space industry holds that there are fewer than the eight-year old 2017 count still working.
Graphic: NASA
While the EMU is a venerable piece of hardware that has served NASA for decades, it is close to its end of life. Now, a NASA audit, released this week by NASA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG), paints a troubling picture of Collins’ work under the $1.5 billion Extravehicular Activity Space Operations Contract (ESOC).
Collins was originally awarded in 2010 for $324 million, the contract has ballooned in size and scope as the ISS mission has been extended through 2030, presumably the same year ISS will be deorbited.
NASA Findings
The report cites repeated delays in delivering life support components, including the fan pump separator and carbon dioxide sensors, which are essential to astronaut safety. In some cases, components originally due in 2020 and 2022 have still not been delivered.
Photo: NASA
| Summary of Deficiencies cited by NASA | ||
| Category | Deficiency | Danger |
|---|---|---|
| Water Intrusion in Helmets | NASA documented multiple incidents where water leaked into astronauts’ helmets during spacewalks, including a 2013 event and another in 2022. | These events pose severe risks of asphyxiation, vision impairment, and communication failure during extravehicular activities. |
| Thermal Regulation Failures | Malfunctions in cooling systems, especially the sublimator units, have caused problems regulating suit temperature. | Uncontrolled temperatures can lead to overheating or hypothermia, endangering astronaut health and limiting operational capability. |
| Injuries from Suit Fit and Design Limitations | The bulky and rigid design has led to physical injuries, particularly in the shoulders and hands, due to poor fit and restricted mobility. | These injuries can impair astronaut performance and require medical attention, possibly compromising mission objectives. |
| Delayed Delivery of Critical Components | Collins has experienced years-long delays in delivering essential life support components, such as fan pump separators and carbon dioxide sensors. | These delays reduce the number of available functioning suits, increasing the risk of suit failure and EVA cancellations. |
| Obsolescence of Replacement Parts | Many suit components are no longer manufactured, and suppliers have exited the market, making replacements difficult. | Continued use of obsolete or expired parts increases the likelihood of system failure during missions. |
| Quality Control Failures | Instances were reported where expired, incorrectly built, or inadequately tested components were installed or shipped, including a component that remained on the ISS two decades past expiration. | These failures compromise suit integrity and astronaut safety, raising the risk of malfunctions in space. |
| Inadequate Management of EVA Anomalies | Collins and NASA experienced delays in identifying and resolving anomalies, such as the 2024 umbilical unit water leak that led to a spacewalk cancellation. | Slow responses to real-time issues increase the risk of loss of life support functions and mission failure. |
| Cost Overruns and Schedule Failures | Over the past three fiscal years, Collins exceeded planned costs by an appreciable amount. | These financial and schedule inefficiencies strain NASA’s resources and delay the availability of safe, functioning suits. |
| Inflated Contractor Performance Ratings | Despite repeated failures, Collins received high performance scores and a majority of available award fees, which the Inspector General deemed inconsistent with actual results. | Overly generous evaluations reduce accountability and hinder meaningful performance improvement. |
NASA’s own evaluations, according to the report, appear to inflate Collins’ performance scores, particularly in technical management and safety compliance, despite “persistent schedule, cost, and quality problems.” In 2023, NASA took the unusual step of sending a formal letter to Collins leadership expressing dissatisfaction across multiple contracts — including ESOC.
NASA management concurred with most of the report’s recommendations and committed to updating evaluation criteria and reassessing award fee practices by the end of 2025. However, they defended the current scores as fair within the broader context of the contract’s scope.
For its part, Collins says it has been troubled by supply chain issues, schedule delays, cost overruns. These problems have threatened NASA’s ability to conduct safe and timely spacewalks, a critical function for ISS maintenance and research.
As of the time of this writing, the company has not responded publicly to the NASA OIG report.
Collins Dropped Out Of Next-Gen Spacesuit Development
In 2019, NASA’s Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel strongly recommended a complete EMU replacement due to the aging technology in the long-running program. In 2022, NASA selected Collins and Axiom Space to develop the next-generation spacesuit systems needed for the Artemis Project and for ISS. Collins was tasked with building the ISS suit, Axiom with the lunar suit.
Things seemed to be going well for Collins in their efforts as they developed and tested their new systems.
Graphic: Collins Aerospace
In 2024, however, Collins dropped out of the program. It was said that NASA and Collins felt that the development timeline would not support the space station’s schedule and NASA’s mission objectives, and thus the contract with Collins was mutually descoped.
Industry chatter suggested at the time that Collins’s program was encountering cost overruns and technical challenges, and that under a fixed-price or tightly constrained contract environment, continuing the program would have risked further losses.
Whether or not that conjecture was true is immaterial: Collins was out, Axiom Space and the AxEMU were the only game in town. Until Axiom’s suit was ready to take over Artemis and ISS use, Collins would continue to support the current EMU. That work is under scrutiny from the NASA OIG Report.
The Next Generation Suit – On The Way And Apparently On Track
Photo: Axiom Space
As mentioned above, Axiom Space is the sole vendor preparing the next generation of spacesuits for NASA and presumably for other customers.
Axiom describes their ISS version of the suit: “Similar to the Artemis III spacesuit, the Axiom Space ISS suit will be built to accommodate a wide range of crew members … provide increased flexibility … life support systems, pressure garments, and power avionics and communication.”
SpaceX
While SpaceX and the Polaris Dawn flight made a lot of noise in 2024 with its EVA, it should be noted that the SpaceX suit tested was not even the old EMU’s equal in terms of environmental control, autonomy, duration, robustness, and task flexibility. The SpaceX suits were intermediate or developmental EVA-capable suits, not yet the full “go-anywhere, high-complexity” spacesuit used by NASA for ISS or lunar EVAs. Theirs is a program still in development.
Currently the AxEMU is undergoing testing and development, focusing on preparation for NASA’s Artemis missions. Recently, for the first time, two AxEMU suits were tested at the same time in the in the Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory at NASA Sonny Carter Training Facility in Houston. Last month astronaut Walter Villadei took part in an integral test of the AxEMU using lunar-task tools, to evaluate stowage, deployment, and usability of tools under realistic constraints.
Photo: NASA
No specific date for testing the new AxEMU suit in space has been given, but multiple sources say that the company is shooting for a Critical Design Review late in 2025 or early 2026. Following the resolution of any action items, the AxEMU may be tested in orbit on ISS prior to being put to work on the lunar surface as part of the Artemis landings.